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INTRODUCTION
Jennifer Daskal’s Borders and Bits1 accurately describes one of
the core challenges regarding jurisdictional law in the twenty-first
century: electronic data—everything from e-mails and text messages to
Facebook and Instagram posts to Twitter pronouncements to drone
warfare data to search algorithms to financial transactions to cloud
data storage—travels around the globe with little relationship to
physical territory. In addition, all of this data is often in the custody
and control of data intermediaries such as Google, Facebook, Twitter,
Apple, Microsoft, Amazon, private military contractors, and so on.
Three important consequences flow from this ubiquitous
technology-enabled, data-driven global societal activity. First, the
territorial location of data becomes increasingly arbitrary and
substantively unimportant. If I, as a U.S. citizen based in Maryland,
have a g-mail account and Google, a U.S. corporation, decides to store
my archived e-mails in Ireland or France or Indonesia (or indeed to split
up the data fragments that make up each e-mail message among data
warehouses in all three countries), that decision seems irrelevant to any
question of whether I have somehow affiliated myself with any of those
communities or governments for purposes of jurisdictional or choice-oflaw analysis. Second, because of this deterritorialization of data, it will
often be the case that territorially based courts (or law enforcement
authorities generally) are unable to easily enforce their decisions
because those decisions require cooperation from relevant actors in farflung communities. Third, as a direct result of the first two problems,
governmental and judicial authorities are increasingly turning to
multinational corporate data intermediaries to carry out and enforce
their orders because only those companies have sufficient global reach
to make legal rulings effective. But deputizing these intermediaries to
become enforcement agents, while logical and possibly effective, raises
new problems regarding the scope of governmental authority and the
distortions involved in privatizing law enforcement.

1.

Jennifer Daskal, Borders and Bits, 71 VAND. L. REV. 179 (2018).
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Daskal’s article does an excellent job of summarizing recent
cases that raise these issues and effectively teasing out the conundrums
that data poses for thinking about jurisdiction. In this Response article,
therefore, I want to focus on two aspects of the jurisdictional question
that are largely beyond the scope of her article. First, I think it is useful
to provide more historical context than her article does both regarding
early internet cases that pre-date the ones Daskal discusses by fifteen
years or so, as well as the scholarly literature that arose in the late
1990s and early 2000s in response to precisely the problems that Daskal
describes. This context is important, I think, because it suggests that
the issues Daskal seeks to address are not new, though they may be
accelerating. Further, the earlier scholarship may actually have more
to offer than her article acknowledges. Second, and relatedly, although
Daskal effectively lays out the problems raised by the
deterritorialization of data, she does not offer much of a roadmap
regarding new jurisdictional principles that might be developed to
respond to this changing social reality. And ironically, it may be that
some of the earlier scholarship on internet jurisdiction might point
usefully towards such principles.
Thus, this Response offers both a “look back” and a “look
forward”: back to the early days of the commercial internet when courts
and scholars first began wrestling with the problems of data’s
deterritorialization; and forward to a set of principles that might guide
legal regimes considering jurisdictional dilemmas in the data-driven
era in which we find ourselves.
I. PLUS ÇA CHANGE…
Reading Daskal’s article, one might reasonably conclude that
the issues she raises are new or have only arisen in the past few years.
Indeed, all of the cases Daskal describes are of relatively recent vintage,
and though Daskal briefly references early scholarly debate about
internet jurisdiction, she does so only in passing and essentially
dismisses that early work as outmoded. However, I think it might be
useful to go back to some of that early scholarship in order to help frame
more precisely what it is about data that is or is not different.
To the extent Daskal references past scholarship on internet
jurisdiction, she focuses on the seminal 1996 article by David G. Post &
David Johnson, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace.2 And
there is a reason for that. This article was the first really to make the
2.
David R. Johnson & David G. Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48
STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996).
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“data is different” argument in order to surface core legal questions
about jurisdiction, sovereignty, and legitimacy. Crucially, the article
made two fundamental points, one descriptive and one normative.
Descriptively, Johnson & Post argued that online interaction
increased the likelihood that activity initiated in one location would
create effects in another location, without regard to territory. As the
authors put it, information “can be transmitted from one physical
location to any other location without degradation, decay, or substantial
delay, and without any physical cues or barriers that might otherwise
keep certain geographically remote places and people separate from one
another.”3 This was and remains the essence of the “data is different”
argument: that physical location may no longer be as relevant with
regard to electronic data, rendering problematic a world of legal
jurisdictions based on territorially delimited authority.
Turning from the descriptive to the normative, Johnson & Post
argued that, because territorially based sovereigns would inevitably
face challenges of sovereignty and legitimacy in regulating online
interaction, we might better think of the online world as its own world
for jurisdictional purposes. Thus, they argued for the creation of an
indigenous law of cyberspace, where different service providers and
websites would compete with each other to offer different rule-sets, and
users would “vote” for the rule-sets they prefer simply by making
decisions as to which rule-sets to use.4
Unfortunately, because this normative claim was relatively easy
to refute as unrealistic cyber-utopianism, scholars tended to ignore the
important descriptive claim as well. Daskal falls into this trap. She
confusingly labels the Johnson & Post position “unterritorialism” and
then quickly dispatches it to the dustbin as a relic of the early internet
era.
But the Johnson & Post argument is neither “unterritorialism”
nor irrelevant. Indeed, for better or worse, Johnson & Post, far from
being “unterritorialists,” started from the assumption that control over
territory was the core principle underlying jurisdiction and sovereignty.
Indeed, it was precisely this territorialism that, to them, made online
interaction such a difficult problem for jurisdictional analysis.
It would therefore be more accurate to call Johnson & Post
cyberspace exceptionalists.5 They believed that the rise of online
interaction required new rules for legal jurisdiction by upsetting old
3.
Id. at 1370–71.
4.
Id. at 1398–99.
5.
This moniker has the added benefit of being the one Post himself adopted. See David G.
Post, Against Cyberanarchy, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1365 (2002).
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assumptions about the general tie between legal effects and territorial
location. And once we view them simply as exceptionalists, there is
actually a straight line from their work to Patricia Bellia’s 2001
Chasing Bits Across Borders6 (which even has an almost identical title
to Daskal’s) to my 2002 article on The Globalization of Jurisdiction7 to
Daskal’s contention that data is different.
Of course, even as a descriptive matter one could debate the
exceptionalist position. For example, Jack Goldsmith argued that
online activity created no fundamentally new legal problem and that
“well-settled” principles in existing conflict-of-laws doctrines were
adequate to address any issues to be resolved.8 As Daskal notes in her
article, Goldsmith’s successor in advancing the unexceptionalist
position is Andrew K. Woods, who has made strikingly similar
arguments to the ones Goldsmith made in the late 1990s.9
To my mind, however, this dichotomy between exceptionalist
and unexceptionalist visions was a false one from the start. First, one’s
perspective on whether the online medium creates a new problem
depends in large part on what the legal question is. For example, if our
focus turned from jurisdiction to simply the substantive law of
defamation, we would note that defamation is generally defined as the
communication of a false statement about someone with the requisite
degree of intent. This communication can be written or oral, and if it is
written, there does not seem to be much of a legal difference whether
the written defamation is communicated by postal mail, fax, or e-mail.
It is still defamation, and the online context doesn’t change the legal
liability question. Thus, unexceptionalism seems to apply to defamation
law. But when we turn to the question of intermediary liability
regarding that same defamatory content and ask whether (and under
what circumstances) various types of internet service providers should
be held liable for defamatory content accessible through their portals,
then we have a question that is not easily answered without some
conceptual understanding of what an internet service provider is or
should be. Or, if we ask a jurisdictional question about where the
defamatory act took place or whose discovery rules would govern the
defamatory e-mail at issue, then again we face core questions about the
nature of jurisdiction. So, online defamation issues require either an
exceptionalist or an unexceptionalist approach, depending on what
aspect of the case one is discussing.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Patricia L. Bellia, Chasing Bits Across Borders, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 35.
Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311 (2002).
See Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199 (1998).
See Andrew K. Woods, Against Data Exceptionalism, 68 STAN. L. REV. 729 (2016).
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The second reason the dichotomy was unhelpful from the
beginning is that the unexceptionalist position assumes that there
actually are well-settled “general” principles of law that can simply be
applied to new legal settings without alteration. And yet it is the nature
of law that it changes over time. Thus, what is “well-settled” for one
generation (or in one century) is apt to be very different from what is
well-settled for the next. Even more importantly, new technologies that
alter the culture are precisely the sorts of changes that tend to result in
shifts to well-settled legal principles.10
For example, in the nineteenth century, “well-settled” U.S.
principles of legal jurisdiction and choice of law saw jurisdiction as
rooted almost exclusively in the territorial power of the sovereign.11
Each sovereign was deemed to have jurisdiction, exclusive of all other
sovereigns, to bind persons and things present within its territorial
boundaries. By the early twentieth century, growth of interstate
commerce, transportation, and cross-border corporate activity put
pressure on the idea that a state’s judicial power extended only to its
territorial boundary. In particular, the invention of the automobile and
the development of the modern corporation meant that far-away
entities could inflict harm within a state without actually being present
there at the time of a lawsuit. Not surprisingly, by the end of the
twentieth century, it had become “well-settled” in U.S. jurisdiction
jurisprudence that a state may at least sometimes assert jurisdiction
over a defendant if the effects of the defendant’s activities are felt within
the state’s borders, even if the defendant has not literally set foot
there.12 Likewise, it had become “well-settled” that choice-of-law rules
could be based on governmental interests or relationships as well as
territorial connections.13 And, of course, these new “well-settled” rules
felt as commonsensical and obvious to most judges, lawyers, and
observers as the more territorialist view felt in the nineteenth century.
Now, it seems safe to say that jurisdictional, choice-of-law, and
judgment recognition rules are in flux again, at least in part because of
online interaction. Indeed, as many of the cases described by Daskal
suggest, the idea of basing jurisdiction on where effects are felt is
difficult to apply to online interaction because our social lives are
increasingly spread out in many different locations, anywhere our data

10. I discuss such cultural shifts in more detail in PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN, GLOBAL LEGAL
PLURALISM: A JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW BEYOND BORDERS (2012).
11. See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAW
(1934).
12. See, e.g., International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
13. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAW (1971).
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is stored, used, or viewed, and we are potentially affected by activity
taking place anywhere, without regard to physical territory.
The answers that law will ultimately evolve to address these
sorts of problems are difficult to predict, and scholars and judges will
no doubt have differing approaches to specific questions of jurisdiction,
choice of law, and judgment recognition regarding online interaction,
virtual worlds, data storage, digital currencies, autonomous entities,
and the like. Suffice to say that however one resolves the issues, “wellsettled” principles of law are unlikely to be very helpful because such
principles are themselves always in flux, often precisely because of the
pressures placed on such principles by new communications
technologies such as the internet and new ways in which social lives
become deterritorialized. Thus, in some sense, a pure unexceptionalist
position is difficult to maintain. But if unexceptionalists relied too much
on the application of mythical well-settled principles, the
exceptionalists, at times, tended to the opposite extreme, assuming that
the rise of online interaction, data storage and the like upend nearly all
extant ideas about law and the role of the state. As we have seen in the
two decades since Johnson & Post wrote their article, state regulation
of online activity remains a potent force, even allowing for all the
jurisdictional conundrums they correctly predicted.
Finally, it is worth noting that, although the cyber-libertarian
idea of a world of independent rule-sets created by websites has not
come to pass, even that prediction was not altogether wrong. As
Daskal’s article makes clear, ubiquitous platforms such as Yahoo!,
Microsoft, Skype, and Google are frequently being commandeered by
territorially based sovereign entities to operate as a worldwide
nonterritorial enforcement mechanism. So the idea that territorially
based sovereigns would be unable to effectively regulate and would
therefore need web-based assertions of jurisdiction is now in many
respects the way things have evolved, for better or worse. And, of
course, the ongoing battles about the enforceability of online “Terms of
Service” agreements make clear that online rule-sets still matter.
Thus,
instead
of
labeling
the
early
scholarship
“unterritorialism” and then dismissing it as a relic of an earlier cyberutopian era, we might more profitably view it as a debate between
exceptionalists and unexceptionalists about the degree to which settled
conflict-of-law principles would provide stable solutions to jurisdictional
issues related to online interaction. Viewed in this way, Daskal’s
argument for data’s difference looks a little less like a new theory for
online regulation and a little more like simply the most recent in a line
of exceptionalist arguments.
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And it is not just the current scholarly debates that echo the
debates of two decades ago, but the legal cases as well. Indeed, the
recent cases Daskal describes reprise many of the dilemmas and
arguments from the first decade of commercial online activity. As early
as 1995, a federal district court in Connecticut ruled that it had proper
jurisdiction over the defendant Instruction Set, a Massachusetts-based
provider of computer technology, even though Instruction Set
maintained no offices in Connecticut and did not conduct regular
business there.14 The court ruled that the defendant’s promotional
website, because it was accessible in Connecticut, supported the
exercise of jurisdiction in the state. According to the court, the website
advertisements were directed to all states within the United
States. Therefore, Instruction Set had “purposely availed itself of the
privilege of doing business within Connecticut.”15 This vision looks
quite a bit like the Belgian assertions of jurisdiction over Yahoo! and
Skype that Daskal describes.16
Similarly, we can see that efforts to limit the jurisdictional reach
of legal decisions over online activity tend to be unsatisfactory. Back in
2000, a French court asserted jurisdiction over Yahoo! and ordered the
site to take all possible measures to dissuade and prevent access in
France to Yahoo! auction sites that sell Nazi memorabilia or other items
that are sympathetic to Nazism or constitute Holocaust denial.17
Undisputedly, selling such merchandise in France would violate French
law,18 and there would have been no jurisdictional dispute had the
French authorities limited their prosecution to the French end-users
who were downloading the illegal materials from Yahoo!’s auction sites.
But even in this early internet era, legal authorities were already
realizing that it is often far more effective to proceed against an
intermediary such as Yahoo!, both because the intermediary is usually
a larger corporate actor and therefore easier to find and because one
legal action can address a broader problem rather than requiring
separate enforcement actions against each end-user. In effect, the
intermediary becomes the enforcement agent of whatever legal
authority issues the order.
14. See Inset Sys. Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1966).
15. See id. at 164.
16. See Daskal, supra note 1, at 192–95.
17. See LICRA v. Yahoo!, Inc.,Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris [hereinafter TGI] [High
Court of Paris], May 22, 2000, http://lthoumyre.chez.com/txt/jurisfr/cti/yauctions20000522.htm,
[https://perma.cc/738B-V9BM].
18. See CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN] [PENAL CODE], art. R.645-1 (prohibiting the public display of
Nazi memorabilia except for the purposes of an historical film, show, or exhibit),
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.do?idArticle=LEGIARTI000006419560&cidText
e=LEGITEXT000006070719, [https://perma.cc/BL8T-4J3A].
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In this case, the intermediary question had two parts, however.
Certainly the French court had undisputed jurisdictional authority over
Yahoo.fr, Yahoo!’s French subsidiary, and Yahoo.fr complied with
requests that access to such sites be blocked.19 What made this action
noteworthy was that the suit was brought not only against Yahoo.fr,
but against Yahoo.com, an American corporation, and the court sought
to enjoin access to non-French websites stored on Yahoo.com’s nonFrench servers. Of course, one can easily see why the court and the
complainants in this action would have taken this additional step.
Shutting down access to web pages on yahoo.fr does no good at all if
French citizens can, by entering a slightly different URL in their search
box, simply go to yahoo.com and access those same pages.
The Google Spain right-to-be-forgotten case that Daskal
describes follows a similar pattern.20 Google was willing to de-index
websites for users using Google’s Spanish portal, google.es, but the
European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) understandably found that solution
inadequate because google.com is so easy for Spaniards to access. But,
as in the Yahoo! case fifteen years earlier, the concern is that deindexing for all users, regardless of location, effectively means that the
ECJ decision is a worldwide injunction, perhaps taking us all the way
back to the 1995 Instruction Set case discussed above. On the other
hand, it is easy to see that the extraterritoriality charge runs in both
directions. If France or Spain is not able to block the access of its citizens
to proscribed material, then the United States will effectively be
imposing First Amendment norms on the entire world. And though
geographical tracking software might seem to solve the problem by
allowing websites or search engines to offer different content to
different users, such a solution would still require the sites to analyze
the laws of all jurisdictions to determine what material to filter for
which users.
The arguments in the Yahoo! and Google Spain cases therefore
are simply reiterations of the basic dichotomy that has been repeated
over twenty years of jurisdictional jurisprudence. On the one hand,
legal authorities wish to assert jurisdiction anywhere a community is
effected by web-based content. This tends to push in the direction of
universal jurisdiction, because content uploaded anywhere in the world
can potentially cause harmful effects anywhere else in the world. In
response, defendants argue for jurisdiction only where content is
19. See LICRA v. Yahoo!, Inc., TGI, Nov. 20, 2000, http://www.lapres.net/yahen11.html,
[https://perma.cc/ALK9-XM6A].
20. See Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), Case C-131/12,
May
13,
2014,
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62012CJ0131,
[https://perma.cc/2367-44E8].
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uploaded or only where their servers are located or only in their home
jurisdiction. This theory of jurisdiction tends to result either in
arbitrary or easily manipulable jurisdictional principles (such as where
a server is located) or a system where actors impacting communities
across the globe can only be sued or regulated in their home jurisdiction.
Both of these solutions seem unsatisfying. And finding some other nonweb-based territorial nexus to bolster an assertion of jurisdiction can
also be problematic. For example, regardless of how one resolves the
jurisdictional question in the Yahoo! case, it seems clear that where in
the world the actual paper share certificate by which Yahoo! owned
Yahoo.fr seems irrelevant to the underlying jurisdictional issues at
stake.
II. A COSMOPOLITAN PLURALIST VISION OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
So, if Daskal is right (and I believe she is) that data is different
and is inexorably and inevitably changing settled expectations about
conflict-of-law rules, what are some of the principles that might help us
make sense of this brave new world in which we find ourselves? This is
beyond the scope of Daskal’s article, but again it seems to me that a look
back might allow us to look forward. In my 2002 article, The
Globalization of Jurisdiction,21 and my 2005 article Towards a
Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflict of Laws: Redefining Governmental
Interests in a Global Era,22 I argued for a cosmopolitan pluralist
conception of conflict of laws. I noted that the movement of our social
activity into various forms of the virtual is a real trend, and it is one
that is bound to unsettle previously settled legal principles. Yet, a time
of flux is also a time of opportunity. As judges, legislators, and scholars
struggle to apply old legal principles to new contexts, they are—in a far
more self-conscious way than usual—questioning whether those old
legal principles really work anymore. Such a time of self-conscious
inquiry opens the conceptual space to allow one to go back to first
principles and ask important jurisprudential and sociologically charged
questions that run throughout all of law.
In addition, moving from the descriptive to the normative, we
can conceptualize the idea of jurisdiction in a way that might take into
consideration the contested and constantly shifting process by which
people imagine communities and their membership in them. Just as a
rigidly territorial conception of jurisdiction eventually gave way in the
21. See Berman, supra note 7.
22. See Paul Schiff Berman, Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflict of Laws: Redefining
Governmental Interests in a Global Era, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1819 (2005).
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first part of the twentieth century to the idea of jurisdiction based on
contacts with a sovereign entity, so too a contacts-based approach might
now yield to a conception of jurisdiction based on community affiliation.
A cosmopolitan23 approach allows us to think of community not
as a geographically determined territory circumscribed by fixed
boundaries, but as a set of multiple affiliations held simultaneously.24
This dynamic understanding of the relationship between the “local”
community and other forms of community affiliation permits us to
conceptualize legal jurisdiction in terms of social interactions that are
fluid processes, not motionless demarcations frozen in time and space.
A court in one country might therefore appropriately assert community
dominion over a legal dispute even if the court’s territorially based
contacts with the dispute are minimal. Conversely, a country that has
certain “contacts” with a dispute might nevertheless be unable to
establish a tie between a local community and a distant defendant
sufficient to justify asserting its dominion.
A cosmopolitan interrogation of conceptions of community,
therefore, might rein in some assertions of jurisdiction over distant acts
while permitting other extraterritorial assertions of jurisdiction that
are currently unrecognized. Accordingly, the cosmopolitan pluralist
conception of jurisdiction I have proposed seeks to capture a middle
ground between strict territorialism on the one hand and a system of
complete universal jurisdiction on the other. In any event, the
jurisdictional inquiry would no longer be based on a reified counting of
contacts with, effects on, or interests of a territorially bounded
population. Rather, courts would take seriously the multiple definitions
of community that might be available, the symbolic significance of
asserting jurisdiction over an actor, and the normative desirability of
conceptualizing the parties before the court as members of the same
legal jurisdiction.
In addition, if nation-states are imagined, historically
contingent communities defined by admittedly arbitrary geographical
boundaries, and if those nation-states—because of transnational flows
23. By “cosmopolitan,” I refer to a multivalent perspective that recognizes the wide variety of
affiliations people feel toward a range of communities, from the most local to the most global. I
therefore distinguish cosmopolitanism from a universalist vision (often associated with
cosmopolitanism), which sees people solely, or primarily, as members of one world community.
Cosmopolitanism, as I use the term, involves an ideal of multiple attachments; it does not
necessarily entail the erasure of nonglobal community affiliations. See, e.g., Bruce Robbins,
Introduction Part I: Actually Existing Cosmopolitanism, in COSMOPOLITICS: THINKING AND
FEELING BEYOND THE NATION 1, 3 (Pheng Cheah & Bruce Robbins eds., 1998) (“[I]nstead of an
ideal of detachment, actually existing cosmopolitanism is a reality of (re)attachment, multiple
attachment, or attachment at a distance.”).
24. See DOREEN MASSEY, SPACE, PLACE, AND GENDER, 154 (1994).
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of information, capital, and people—no longer define unified
communities (if they ever did), then there is no conceptual justification
for conceiving of nation-states as possessing a monopoly on the
assertion of jurisdiction. Instead, any comprehensive theory of
jurisdiction must acknowledge that nonstate communities also assert
various claims to jurisdictional authority and articulate alternative
norms that are often incorporated into more “official” legal regimes.
This pluralist25 understanding of jurisdiction helps us to see that law is
not merely the coercive command of a sovereign power, but a language
for imagining alternative future worlds. Moreover, various normgenerating communities (not just the sovereign) are always contesting
the shape of such worlds.
Finally, as the survey of cases makes clear, in a world of
deterritorialized data, the role of intermediaries as lawmakers and law
enforcers has radically increased. When Facebook enforces Terms of
Service agreements, or Twitter is asked (or required) to police hate
speech, or Google implements an ECJ ruling, we can call these acts of
intermediaries law or not, but a pluralist would argue that it doesn’t
matter how you define it; the fact is that it affects the behavior of real
people in the real world. Indeed, the actions of intermediaries can have
more impact than the sometimes empty commands of a sovereign. A
pluralist perspective has the advantage of not getting caught up in
definitions of law but instead recognizing that the quasi law created,
imposed, and/or applied by nongovernmental entities should remain
within our legal analytical purview whether we call it law or not.
III. BUILDING JURISDICTIONAL RULES IN A DETERRITORIALIZED, DATADRIVEN WORLD
So, how might we build a conflict-of-laws jurisprudence that
reflects a world of deterritorialized data? How can we create a
cosmopolitan pluralist vision that takes account of changing social
reality without either starting from scratch and throwing out all extant
conflicts principles on the one hand, or simply assuming current
doctrine will suffice on the other hand? In short, how can we meld
exceptionalist and unexceptionalist positions to develop workable
provisional compromises to govern the ubiquitous virtual worlds of the
twenty-first century?
As a true believer in common law case-by-case adjudication, I
cannot provide a comprehensive code that anticipates all permutations
25. For a more detailed application of the insights of legal pluralism to conflict-of-laws
questions, see BERMAN, supra note 10.
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of human activity and provides a definitive answer. Indeed, one of the
important lessons of conflict of laws, it seems to me, is that there is no
single unifying grand theory that can provide an authoritative answer
to every possible dilemma or account for the infinite variety of human
activity that may arise. And even if we could, such a grand theory would
instantly become obsolete as new advances in technology, science,
communications, and transportation keep galloping on ahead of the
lumbering efforts of law to catch up.
Thus, all I can offer is a set of provisional principles that might
guide the development of conflict-of-laws doctrines. These principles, at
most, provide a framework for analyzing the knotty conflicts problems
that deterritorialized data creates:
A. The territorial location of data or servers is irrelevant.
In an era of cloud computing, data can be anywhere. As the
Microsoft Ireland case26 makes clear, even a simple e-mail message can
be stored in a location completely unrelated to the sender or recipient
or even the home of the company that controls the storage. Further, the
message might not even be stored in one location; its component data
parts could be split among data warehouses within multiple territorial
sovereignties. And not only is the location arbitrary, but it is malleable.
The data can easily be shifted from place to place instantly and
algorithmically, with no human being even making a conscious decision
to relocate. Finally, it is the service provider, not the end-user, that
ultimately controls the data location. Even if an individual lives all her
life in one territorial location and deposits money in her local branch of
a multinational financial institution, data related to that account could
move anywhere, all based on the data storage scheme of the financial
institution.
The arbitrary and malleable nature of data storage wreaks
havoc on jurisdictional systems that rely on territorial location. In
response, some countries are pursuing legislation that would require
the localization of data.27 Under these statutes, data related to an
individual must remain stored within the home country of that
individual. This strikes me as precisely the wrong way to go about
solving the problem. It seems to me that, if jurisdictional rules do not
map well onto the reality of human activity, it’s a sign that

26. Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 356
(2017).
27. See Anupam Chander & Uyên P. Lê, Data Nationalism, 64 EMORY L. J. 677 (2015)
(surveying data localization implementation and its effects across various countries).
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jurisdictional rules need to change, not that we need to squelch or limit
that human activity.
B. The place of incorporation of a corporation is potentially
relevant to the jurisdictional calculus, but should not be determinative.
Even those who accept that data and server location should not
determine jurisdiction may balk at the idea that place of incorporation
should similarly not be determinative. After all, we may think that a
corporation should be free to choose the state or country by which it is
regulated. And certainly sometimes the place of incorporation signals
both a substantive affiliation with that jurisdiction and a willingness to
submit to that jurisdiction’s laws.
Yet, sometimes, place of incorporation is just as arbitrary and
manipulated as data or server location. Individuals with no connection
with the United States can easily create a U.S. company and then claim
protection of U.S. law (and U.S. courts) even though nothing about the
dispute at issue really evinces a connection with the United States.
Likewise, in the internet taxation context, corporations can choose to
incorporate in a foreign jurisdiction and potentially skirt local tax laws
even if most of the corporation’s revenue derives from that local
jurisdiction. Creating a subsidiary can also shield a corporation from
liability. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to permit a
state to assert jurisdiction over a foreign parent company selling
products locally solely because the sale passed through a third
corporation that acted as the U.S. distributor.28 But the third-party
corporation in this case wasn’t truly independent; it was essentially just
a subsidiary corporation with an exclusive arrangement to distribute
the foreign corporation’s products in the United States.29 Thus, if
jurisdiction is automatically tied to place of incorporation without any
further analysis of the underlying social or economic reality, distortions
may result.
C. Community affiliation is a more plausible basis for legal
jurisdiction than contacts with a territorially based sovereign.
Instead of relying on arbitrary, manipulable, and
nonsubstantive connections to a forum, such as data location, server
location, or place of incorporation, community affiliation provides a
28. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011).
29. Id. at 896–98 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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potentially more appropriate test for jurisdiction and choice of law in
the twenty-first century. The question then becomes to what extent
have the parties taken steps to associate themselves with a particular
community, and to what extent is the lawsuit in question related to the
concerns of a particular community?
A community affiliation test provides a more satisfactory way of
analyzing cases such as Microsoft Ireland. Rather than looking at where
the underlying data happens to be located, the relevant question would
be the location and/or nationality of the actual user whose information
the government wants to search or the corporation from which the
government is seeking the information.
D. Trying to serve a market is a more relevant jurisdictional hook than
targeting a territory.
In a world of deterritorialized data and multinational corporate
activity, it can be difficult to determine when a corporation has targeted
a particular jurisdiction. For example, were the Yahoo! auction sites
that were selling Holocaust denial and Nazi memorabilia material
targeting French customers? Or, to ask a different question, was
Yahoo.com explicitly targeting French customers? After all, many
websites are simply accessible in many different jurisdictions without
particularly targeting any one of them. Accordingly, it seems odd if a
desire to access a global market would allow a company to avoid
jurisdiction in any particular jurisdiction just because no one
jurisdiction was explicitly targeted. Yet, that is precisely what a
plurality of United States Supreme Court justices would have ruled in
the recent case of J. McIntyre Machinery Ltd. v. Nicastro.30 In that case,
the Court overturned the jurisdictional assertion of a state over a
corporation. The plurality did so on the ground that the corporation had
not explicitly targeted that particular state.31 But, as the dissent
pointed out, the company was aiming to exploit a national market and
so the fact that it wasn’t targeting any particular state should not deny
the state a basis for asserting jurisdiction.32 Indeed, for a global product
offered on an undifferentiated basis to multiple markets, it can be
difficult to determine whether the product is truly being targeted
anywhere.
In contrast, a community affiliation analysis would allow an
inquiry into whether a party is attempting to serve a particular
30. See 564 U.S. 873 (2011).
31. Id. at 884–85 (Kennedy J., plurality opinion).
32. Id. at 893–94 (Ginsburg J., dissenting).
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community or market its products there. Thus, community affiliation
would provide a more satisfying way of justifying the Belgian assertion
of jurisdiction over Yahoo!33 and Skype34 or the ECJ35 or Canadian36
assertions of jurisdiction over Google. In all of those cases, the service
provider is making a sustained effort to access a major commercial
market as part of the companies’ continuous and systematic global
business strategy. Thus, those companies are purposely affiliating
themselves with the foreign markets, and regulation by those
communities is potentially justifiable.
E. The size, sophistication, and economic breadth of an actor is
relevant to the jurisdictional inquiry.
As noted previously, since the very first internet jurisdiction
cases in the mid-1990s, courts and commentators have struggled with
what seem to be two unpalatable jurisdictional options: either
jurisdiction is only legitimate where the operator of the website is
located or jurisdiction is potentially appropriate wherever the website
is viewable. The first option allows for regulatory evasion and the
second pushes towards a form of universal jurisdiction. Indeed, part of
what concerns commentators about the Belgian court decisions in the
Yahoo! and Skype cases is that, as articulated by the courts, the
rationale seems to sweep so broadly.37
But there is no necessary reason that the hypothetical case of an
individual posting on a personal website or Facebook page needs to be
treated the same as Yahoo! posting on its homepage. Indeed, as Justice
Breyer has recognized, the possible types of internet transaction are so
varied that it is difficult to create one overarching rule.38 He posits a
coffee farmer in Kenya selling artisanal coffee online in small quantities
and contrasts that with a large multinational industrialist selling
thousands of units per year.39 Even if both products cause harm abroad,
33. Public Prosecutor v. Yahoo!, Inc., Hof van Cassatie [Cass.] [Court of Cassation] [Supreme
Court of Belgium], Dec. 1, 2015, No. P.13.2082.N (Belg.), translated in 13 DIGITAL EVIDENCE &
ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE L. REV. 156 (2016).
34. Public Prosecutor v. Skype, Tribunal de Première Instance [Civ.] [Tribunal of First
Instance], Mechelen, Oct. 27, 2016, No. ME 20.4.1 105151-12, ¶¶ 1.2-1.5 (Belg.),
http://www.wolterskluwer.be/files/communities/legalworld/rechtspraak/2016/Corr.%20Mechelen
%2027%20oktober%202016%20(Skype).pdf [https://perma.cc/C5Z7-EZ9Y].
35. See Google Spain, supra note 20.
36. Google Inc. v. Equustek Solutions, Inc., [2017] S.C.R. 34 (Can.), https://scccsc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/16701/index.do [https://perma.cc/6JE4-GBSU].
37. Daskal, supra note 1, at 195.
38. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 891–92 (2011) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
39. See id.
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there is no reason that both defendants need to be treated identically
for jurisdictional purposes.
Community affiliation analysis provides a way out of this
seeming conundrum. A large industrialist seeking to sell multiple units
on a regular basis as part of a global business plan and earning
substantial revenue in the process is trying to access a community in a
way that is very different from me as a professor posting my thoughts
on a personal webpage. Certainly my thoughts may constitute hate
speech or libel or copyright infringement in some foreign jurisdiction.
But that does not mean that I have affiliated myself with that distant
community or in any way sought to access it.
F. The effects of activities can provide a plausible basis for the
assertion of jurisdiction, even without a territorial nexus.
Notwithstanding community affiliation (or the lack of it), there
might be some extreme cases where a community might justifiably wish
to assert jurisdiction over a distant act or actor based on the egregious
impact of the act on that community. Harm from pollution is the
example that immediately springs to mind. It is easy to imagine a
company in one country dumping toxic waste into a river, which then
flows downstream and causes harm to communities in a different
country. In such a circumstance, one can readily imagine the
downstream community wishing to assert jurisdiction.
The tricky question is how far to extend this sort of jurisdictional
rationale that is based on effects. Taken to an extreme, it could swallow
up all the other rules and lead to universal jurisdiction because an act
in one place could always potentially cause harm somewhere else. So,
as noted above, any assertion of purely effects-based jurisdiction should
also consider all the other factors described: community affiliation,
effort to exploit a market, size of company, and so on. And although it
is impossible to predict all the potential factual settings in which this
question may arise, the point is that these factors should at least temper
the potential problems associated with jurisdiction based only on
effects.
G. Enforcing a judgment through a powerful intermediary is not
inherently illegitimate, but the resulting intermediary enforcement
must be regulated, not simply delegated.
Governments have always enacted regulation through powerful
intermediaries. For example, if regulatory authorities want passengers
in automobiles to use seat belts, they can regulate seatbelt use directly,
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but they can also require automobile manufacturers to have the car
make annoying chiming sounds if the car is moving with the seatbelt
unbuckled. Such intermediary regulation is likely to be far more
effective because it does not require constant surveillance by state
actors.
On the other hand, in the context of data intermediaries, the
regulation can, as we see in the Google Spain case, turn the
intermediary into a quasi-adjudicative administrative agency.40 Such a
move solves enforcement issues, because Google can apply the ECJ
legal order effectively around the globe without constant monitoring or
jurisdictional difficulties. But it leads to two interrelated questions.
First, is the burden placed on intermediaries appropriate? And second,
might intermediary enforcement regimes lead to overenforcement?
As to the first question, the burden is surely great. In the first
two years or so after the ruling was issued, Google reportedly received
528,756 requests and evaluated 1,634,370 URLs for removal.41 And of
course, it’s not as if the ECJ criteria provided clear bright lines to apply.
Many decisions will therefore require interpretation and careful legal
analysis. And parties unhappy with Google’s decision can then
challenge the decision in court, leading to more expense for Google.
Yet, I am inclined to think that this is simply the cost of doing
business when one has essentially become a monopoly common carrier
for online search. Certainly, if Google wants to withdraw from the
European commercial scene, it could extricate itself from the ECJ
judgment, but undoubtedly the company has performed a cost-benefit
analysis and decided that it’s worth it to continue providing search
services to European end-users.
The second question is more troubling. After all, if someone
contacts Google to request de-indexing under the ECJ decision, it is
surely far easier for Google to err on the side of granting the de-indexing
request rather than risk the aggrieved party challenging Google in
court. Thus, although the ECJ decision tries to balance individual
privacy concerns with the need to maintain free access to truthful
information, it is highly likely that, over time, enforcing that balance
through Google will tend to err on the privacy side and de-emphasize
the countervailing value of protecting public informational access.

40. See Google Spain, supra note 20.
41. Guy Vassall-Adams & Jacob P. Goldstein, Presentation at the MLRC Media Law
Conference September 2016: Google Spain and the Right to Be Forgotten Two Years Later, 3 (July
2016) (outline available at http://www.medialaw.org/component/k2/item/3538-google-spain-andthe-right-to-be-forgotten-two-years-later?tmpl=component&print=1)
[https://perma.cc/U4W2YQAK].
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For this reason, a decision like the one the Canadian Supreme Court
reached in Equustek,42 though structurally similar to the ECJ decision,
is less problematic. In that case, the court ordered Google to de-index a
defined and limited set of web pages, which Google can do quickly and
mechanically without requiring teams of attorneys making interpretive
judgments. Moreover, the pages to be de-indexed were sales sites, not
principally sites providing public information. Thus, if the ECJ or other
courts are going to ask large data intermediaries to have commoncarrier-like responsibilities, they must either define the scope of the
enforcement order narrowly or provide ongoing oversight, monitoring,
and guidance so that the intermediary is not making too many
discretionary legal decisions on behalf of government.
H. Terms of Service agreements will not necessarily resolve jurisdiction
and choice-of-law decisions.
One way of trying to solve knotty online jurisdictional or choiceof-law problems is to fall back on contractual forum selection or choiceof-law clauses. This is a tempting solution, particularly because most
interactions between end-users and intermediaries are at least
nominally governed by Terms of Service agreements, those “click
through” contracts that most users never read, but simply agree to in
order to gain entrance to the site they are accessing. If such Terms of
Service agreements are enforced, they can solve many potential
jurisdictional and choice-of-law problems. But should they be enforced?
And who gets to make the enforcement decision? It turns out that both
of these questions can prove problematic.
To begin, there are many reasons that Terms of Service
agreements might not be enforced. First, the agreements are not true
bargained-for exchanges. Rather, they are so-called “contracts of
adhesion” that are more accurately analyzed as part of the product itself
and therefore perhaps subject to a kind of implied warranty of
merchantability or a general consumer protection law governing
deception.43 Thus, substantively unfair terms in such a Terms of Service
agreement might be deemed unconscionable.44 Second, some courts will
not allow parties to bargain around local law by choosing a foreign
forum or foreign law to adjudicate their dispute.45 Third, courts might
recast a jurisdictional dispute as a disagreement about the validity of
42. See Google v. Equustek Solutions, supra note 36.
43. For an argument along these lines, see generally MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE:
THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2014).
44. See, e.g., Comb v. Paypal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (N.D. Ca. 2002).
45. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(a).

Berman_Galley (Do Not Delete)

30

2/2/2018 4:27 PM

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:11

the Terms of Service agreement itself, which is a disagreement that can
be decided based on forum law, not the law called for in the agreement.46
After all, if the contract is invalid, then so is that contract’s forum
selection or choice-of-law clause. And fourth, courts might recast the
dispute in the case as a tort or an issue of criminal law or evidence or
some other noncontractual regime.47 Once recharacterized in this way,
the dispute becomes one that can be decided without reference to any
contractual agreement.
Beyond the question of whether the contract will be enforced is
the additional uncertainty regarding which court is even making the
enforcement decision in the first place. After all, the four inquiries
summarized above concerning the validity of the Terms of Service
agreement are all likely to be made by the forum court using local law
(that is, the court and law the plaintiff chose) regardless of what the
forum selection or choice-of-law clauses say. This is because, again, the
initial determination of contract validity cannot be made using the
contract’s own forum selection or choice-of-law clause; that would
require assuming the validity of the contract, the very issue that is
being questioned.
I. The decision regarding whether to enforce another jurisdiction’s
judgment is not the same as the decision regarding whether to issue
that judgment in the first instance.
When faced with an enforcement decision regarding a foreign
judgment, courts should not necessarily assume that their own local
public policies trump the dictates of the foreign judgment. Instead,
courts must undertake a nuanced inquiry concerning whether the
affiliations of the parties render the original court judgment legitimate.
Although the local policies of the forum country are not irrelevant, those
policies should be weighed against the overall systemic interest in
creating an interlocking system of international adjudication.
This is not so different from what courts within federal-style
systems already do in domestic cases raising judgment recognition
issues. For example, the United States Supreme Court has long held
that states cannot refuse to enforce sister-state judgments on the
ground that doing so would violate the rendering state’s public policy.48
46. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont, Governing Law on Forum-Selection Agreements, 66
HASTINGS L.J. 643 (2015) (discussing this issue).
47. See, e.g., Melia v. Zenhire, Inc., 462 Ma. 164 (2012) (using state Wage Act law to govern
employment contract rather than the law specified in the contract).
48. See Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998) (making clear that there is no
public policy exception to the full faith and credit due judgments).
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Likewise, the ECJ has attempted to lay down a strong rule of judgment
recognition that allows courts to interpose only European public policies
to avoid recognizing the judgment of another member state, not their
own parochial public policies.49
Of course, within a single, relatively homogenous country, the
idea of one state enforcing another state’s judgment does not seem quite
so significant because the variations from state to state are likely to be
relatively minor. Yet, while the decision to enforce a judgment surely
will be less automatic when the judgment at issue was rendered by a
court of a different nation-state, many of the same principles still are
relevant. Most importantly, what we might call “conflicts values”
should be part of the judgment recognition calculus. Thus, courts should
acknowledge the importance of participating in an interlocking
international legal system, where litigants cannot simply avoid
unpleasant judgments by relocating. Indeed, there is no need for
inherent suspicion of foreign judgments. Certainly deference to other
courts will have long-term reciprocal benefits. And, particularly when
the parties have no significant affiliation with the forum state, there is
little reason for a court to insist on following domestic public policies in
the face of such competing conflicts values.
This is not to say, of course, that foreign judgments should
always be enforced. Indeed, even in a cosmopolitan system, one would
expect that judges might sometimes interpose local public policies
where they would not in the domestic state-to-state setting. But if we
acknowledge the importance of the conflicts values effectuated by
strong judgment recognition, we will necessarily reject the idea that a
court is simply unable to enforce a judgment just because such a
judgment could not have been issued by the court in the first instance.
Instead, we will appreciate that enforcing a foreign judgment is
fundamentally different from issuing an original judgment; indeed,
judgment recognition implicates an entirely distinct set of concerns
about the role of courts in a multijurisdictional world.
CONCLUSION
Of course, these nine principles, neither taken on their own nor
in combination, will completely solve the conflicts problems raised by
the increasing deterritorialization of data. Indeed, there are no perfect
49. See Joined Cases C-404/15 & C-659/15 PPU, Pál Aranyosi & Robert Caldararu v.
Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Bremen, 2016 E.C.R. 198, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/
document.jsf;jsessionid=9ea7d0f130d57f798913232b45cabe6aab2cf36bb51b.e34KaxiLc3eQc40La
xqMbN4PaNqRe0?text=&docid=175547&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&
part=1&cid=253357 [https://perma.cc/2H7U-7BT4].
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solutions, and the factual settings whereby these sorts of problems may
arise are so multifaceted and unpredictable that trying to develop a
comprehensive set of rules to govern all eventualities strikes me as a
fool’s errand. Moreover, even if we could discover a grand scheme for
handling these questions, it is unlikely that all communities in the
world (or their judicial bodies) would agree. Therefore, no amount of
analysis will ever wipe out the reality of legal pluralism and its
attendant uncertainties.
Nevertheless, it is incumbent on legal scholars today to
recognize the new challenges arising in this increasingly data-driven
world and to build new cosmopolitan pluralist legal models that may,
over time, become simply the way we conceptualize law in the twentyfirst century. As Daskal’s article makes clear, the deterritorialization of
data requires us to think differently about law’s attachment to physical
objects in physical space as the basis for legal jurisdiction. And as we
enter the next two decades of legal scholarship surrounding the
internet, it is clear that the fundamental challenges identified in the
late 1990s are still in flux. Thus, the new settled expectations that may
ultimately emerge are at this moment still contested and uncertain.
Creative scholars such as Daskal and others will therefore need to keep
pushing for new approaches that bring our system of law into better
dialogue with our ever-changing social reality.

